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The United States' military action against Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network and his 
hosts, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, will have major implications for the security 
and stability of Central Asia. Virtually overnight, two of Afghanistan's northern neighbors, 
the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, moved from positions of 
relative unimportance vis-à-vis US foreign policy to center stage in the military 
campaign. In addition to striking a blow against terrorism and raising their visibility in 
Washington, both states have important long-term interests in Afghanistan that reflect 
their internal economic and security predicaments. 
Uzbekistan: Fears of Islamic Insurgency
On 5 October 2001, at the conclusion of his visit to Uzbekistan, US Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that he and Uzbek President Islam Karimov had 
come to an agreement on US use of Uzbek bases and airspace in the event of military 
action against Afghanistan. At a press conference announcing the deal, Karimov 
stressed that Uzbekistan was to be used solely as a staging ground for humanitarian 
and search-and-rescue operations.(2) US deployment in Uzbekistan began 
immediately, and by mid-October 2001, 2,000 soldiers of the US Army's 10th Mountain 
Division were on the ground in southern Uzbekistan.(3)
The agreement took many observers by surprise, and led to immediate speculations 
about a possible quid pro quo from the United States. Speculations ranged from 
economic concessions to reduced criticism of Uzbekistan's appalling human rights 
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record.(4) Although Karimov himself strenuously denied the presence of any quid pro 
quo whatsoever, statements made both by the US and Uzbek governments may provide 
some insight into the nature of the arrangement.
When US President George W. Bush addressed Congress on 20 September 2001, he 
mentioned two Islamic militant organizations by name. One was the relatively well-
known Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement, the organization behind the 1981 
assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The second was one whose name 
can hardly have been well-known to the American viewing public: the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan (IMU). The IMU, discussed in more detail below, consists of a small 
(probably not more than a few thousand) group of guerrilla fighters, mostly fugitives 
from Karimov's crackdown on Islamic dissidents, which began in the early 1990s. That 
the president of the United States should refer to a relatively small insurrectionist 
movement in what was to most Americans an extremely obscure corner of the world 
could hardly have been a coincidence, and may reveal something of the US-Uzbek 
agreement.
A further sign might be found in the joint statement signed by the two governments on 7 
October 2001 and released on 12 October. In the statement, Uzbekistan and the United 
States pledged to establish a "quantitatively new relationship based on a long-term 
commitment to advance security and regional stability."(5) This arrangement, according 
to the statement, would include "the need to consult on an urgent basis about 
appropriate steps to address the situation in the event of a direct threat to the security or 
territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan,"(6) perhaps an oblique reference to the 
IMU.
The IMU has its origins in the Islamic opposition to Karimov's rule that emerged in the 
Farghona Valley(7) immediately following Uzbekistan's independence. In March 1992, 
Uzbek security forces moved against one such opposition group, Adolat ("Justice"), 
which since the winter of the previous year had held effective control of the city of 
Namangan.(8) Many members of Adolat were arrested; others disappeared or fled into 
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exile. Two of the latter, Jum'aboy Khojiev (later known as Jum'a Namanganiy) and Tohir 
Yuldoshev, later re-emerged as leaders of the IMU.(9)
The IMU seems to have attracted little official attention until the spring of 1998, when 
Karimov accused the IMU of being behind the murders of four senior police officials in 
Namangan, and took advantage of the opportunity to pass a law tightening restrictions 
on religious organizations in the republic.(10) In February 1999, a series of car 
bombings took place in Tashkent, killing 16; Karimov apparently had been the intended 
target of one of the car bombs. Immediately after the attacks, Karimov alluded to the 
1998 murders in Namangan, strongly implying that the bombings, too, were the work of 
the IMU.(11) Although Yuldoshev denied any IMU involvement,(12) Karimov seized the 
opportunity to launch a brutal wave of repression against Islamic opponents, both real 
and imagined, a campaign which continues to this day.(13)
In the summers of 1999 and 2000, forces of the IMU launched a series of raids from the 
territory of Tajikistan against neighboring regions of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Although militarily insignificant, the raids caused great alarm in Tashkent. In addition, 
the 2000 raid resulted in the brief hostage-taking of four American mountaineers, which 
earned the IMU a space on the US State Department's list of terrorist organizations.(14) 
Following both incursions, IMU forces retreated into Tajikistan, from where they were 
eventually persuaded to leave and were escorted to the Afghan border by the Tajik 
government.(15) Keeping the IMU forces out of Tajikistan, however, has proved 
extremely difficult; in January 2001 came reports that a further 300 IMU fighters had to 
be escorted out.(16)
Quite obviously, the IMU was able to cross the Afghan-Tajik border and move across 
certain parts of Tajik territory almost at will, a fact which implies close ties with former 
United Tajik Opposition (UTO) commanders, members of the Afghan Northern Alliance, 
and perhaps the Russian border guards stationed there. Indeed, on both occasions, the 
withdrawal of IMU forces to Afghanistan was negotiated and overseen by Mirzo Ziyoev, 
Tajikistan's Minister of Emergencies and the former military commander of the UTO; 
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according to some reports, Namanganiy was under Ziyoev's direct command during the 
Tajik civil war.(17) Following his latest expulsion from Tajikistan, however, Namanganiy 
seems to have sought new allies. In early 2001, a Taliban minister confirmed that 
Namanganiy had asked for and received asylum in Taliban-controlled territory.(18) In the 
summer of 2001 came unconfirmed reports that Namanganiy had been made a deputy 
of bin Laden and put in command of an "international brigade" of Chechens, Uyghurs, 
Pakistanis and others,(19) whose reported numerical strength ranged from 2,000 to 
9,000 and was allegedly based in the northern Afghan city of Taluqan.(20) His tenure, 
however, may have been short-lived. On 19 November 2001, as fighting between the 
Northern Alliance and the Taliban raged over the northern Afghan city of Kunduz (the 
Taliban's sole remaining stronghold in northern Afghanistan), Northern Alliance General 
Abdurrashid Dostum first reported to the BBC that Namanganiy had been killed in the 
fighting, a report which was later confirmed by Tajik military sources. At the time of 
writing, however, Namanganiy's death has not been independently confirmed, nor has 
his body been found. Responding to the reports of Namanganiy's death, a spokesman 
for Uzbekistan's foreign ministry, Bahodir Umarov, expressed his government's elation 
at the news, stating: "Our supreme court sentenced him to death two [sic] years ago.
(21) Now that sentence has been carried out."(22)
As elated as Uzbekistan's government might be over the apparent death of 
Namanganiy, this alone cannot guarantee the republic's future security. For one thing, it 
seems that the actual military threat posed by the IMU was negligible. A far more 
serious Islamist challenge to Karimov comes from an organization known as the Hizb 
ut-Tahrir, the "Party of Freedom," a genuinely international organization seeking, it 
claims, to use nonviolent means to oust all existing Islamic governments and replace 
them with a unified Caliphate. Hizb ut-Tahrir is highly secretive, highly organized, and 
very active in the three Farghona Valley states. Operating in small local cells, Hizb ut-
Tahrir cannot be defeated by a military assault.(23) Furthermore, unless Karimov 
ceases his brutal suppression of any and all dissent and takes real steps to improve the 
lives of his citizens, support for movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir is likely to only 
increase.
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Tajikistan: The Quest for a Secure Border
It seems that Tajik President Emomali Rahmonov's motives for cooperating with the US 
are rather more diffuse than Karimov's, and center on concerns over Tajikistan's 800-
mile (1,200-kilometer) border with Afghanistan. Large parts of the border pass through 
very rugged and remote mountain territory, and are virtually impossible to control. This 
has become particularly important since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Tajikistan's 
descent into anarchy almost immediately thereafter. Among groups taking advantage of 
the new permeability of the border were the armed forces of the United Tajik Opposition 
who routinely staged cross-border raids during the 1992-1997 Tajik civil war.(24)
The inability of Dushanbe to secure the border led to the deployment of 15,000 Russian 
troops in 1993 and direct Russian involvement in the Tajik civil war. With the fall of 
Kabul to the Taliban in September 1996, Russia began to pressure the Tajik government 
to reach an accommodation with the rebel forces. A cease-fire between Dushanbe and 
the UTO was declared in December 1996; the following June a peace treaty was signed 
in Moscow. Moreover, the fall of Kabul prompted Moscow to dispatch a further 10,000 
troops to the Tajik-Afghan border,(25) which remains under the control of Russian forces 
to this day.
Keenly aware of his dependence on Russian military support, Rahmonov has been one 
of the most pro-Russian leaders in Central Asia, in stark contrast to Karimov, who has 
charted a much more independent course. In the current conflict, Rahmonov has 
declared that he is in consultation with Russian President Vladimir Putin "every day or 
every second day, sometimes every hour, depending on the situation."(26) These close 
ties with Russia may help explain why Rahmonov has been even more reticent than 
Karimov when discussing the nature of US-Tajik cooperation in the current campaign. 
Conflicting reports have been circulating over the presence of US forces on Tajik soil 
and the use by the US of Tajik airspace and facilities.
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It does seem that the US and Tajikistan recently have come to an agreement, no doubt 
with Russia's blessing. In early November 2001, Rumsfeld visited Dushanbe, later 
announcing that Tajikistan had agreed to open its airspace and share intelligence with 
the US,(27) and on 7 November Interfax reported that Rahmonov had granted the US 
the right to inspect three Tajik airfields (in the cities of Kulob, Qurghonteppa, and 
Khujand),(28) although Tajik officials have stated publicly that these airports may not in 
fact be capable of accommodating the heavy aircraft used by the US.(29) Recently, 
there have been reports that US and French military personnel studying the Kulob 
airfield have reached a similar conclusion.(30)
Chief among Tajikistan's concerns regarding its southern neighbor is Afghanistan's role 
as a major supplier of drugs, particularly heroin. Afghanistan ranks as the world's largest 
supplier of heroin, and Tajikistan has become a major conduit for Afghan heroin moving 
from Afghanistan into Russia and Western Europe; of six known Afghan drug-smuggling 
routes, three lead through Tajikistan.(31) Arrests in Tajikistan for drugs trafficking are an 
almost daily occurrence; the desperate economic situation of much of the country has 
been driving large numbers of people, increasingly women, into the trade.(32) There 
has also been evidence of the involvement of high-level Tajik officials in trafficking as 
well.(33) As a result, Tajikistan faces rapidly increasing rates of crime, addiction, and 
HIV infection.(34)
The Taliban government, under international pressure, did take measures to suppress 
the production of opium in Afghanistan; in July 2000 the Taliban's spiritual leader, Mulla 
Muhammad Omar, decreed that the Koran expressly forbids the cultivation and trade of 
opium, and production dramatically decreased. (There has been no evidence that the 
Northern Alliance, many of whose forces are likewise suspected of involvement in the 
heroin trade, have undertaken any similar initiatives.) Large stockpiles of raw opium and 
heroin already existed, however, and cross-border traffic continued.(35) Nor did the US 
air campaign stop the flow; in October 2001, 300 metric tons of narcotics reportedly 
were seized on the Uzbek-Tajik border, and one Russian soldier reportedly was killed in 
a shootout with smugglers.(36)
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It seems that the border guards have not proved entirely effective in maintaining the 
perimeter. Russian border guards told Anna Badkhen, a visiting journalist, that drugs are 
transported into Tajikistan in Jeeps under convoy. "Everyone is a smuggler here," the 
officer says to her as he sends a local man to fetch a heroin sample. "The exchange - 
and its comfortable familiarity - says a lot about the local culture," Badkhen concludes.
(37) Tajikistan may take advantage of its enhanced international profile to win greater 
international assistance in securing the border, and in fact the German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer, on a recent visit to Dushanbe, announced that Germany would be 
sending experts and funds to help improve Tajikistan's border infrastructure.(38) 
Conclusion: Prospects for Future Stability
Historically, the fate of Central Asia has been linked inextricably with that of Afghanistan. 
Cultural and historical ties, particularly with the Uzbek- and Dari-speaking regions of the 
country,(39) are profound, and memories of this relationship are alive today; one 
example is modern Uzbek emphasis on a 15th-century poet from the Afghan city of 
Harat, Alisher Nawaiy, considered by many to be the "father of Uzbek literature." 
Afghanistan also loomed large in the historical and cultural imaginings of Tajik 
intellectuals in the late 1980s and early 1990s who sought to foster closer ties with 
Persian(40) speakers in Afghanistan.(41) Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have lent material 
(and perhaps even military) support to various Northern Alliance factions since the 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, backing Abdurrashid Dostum (an ethnic Uzbek) and 
Ahmad Shah Mas'ud (a Tajik), respectively. For both countries, however, the first priority 
must be a stable Afghanistan, which can only be achieved through a broad-based 
government in which all major ethnic groups are represented, and in which no one 
ethnic group is seen as benefiting unduly from international aid. Clearly, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan will both have a major role to play in reconstructing Afghanistan.(42) Both 
presidents have at least paid lip service to this idea; time will tell how sincere these 
pronouncements are. Of far greater importance to their own stability, however, will be 
how these countries seek to address the internal factors of grinding poverty and political 
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repression within their borders. Here, the signs so far have been decidedly less than 
encouraging.
The United States now has a unique opportunity to use its new friendship with the 
governments of both states, particularly Uzbekistan, to urge them to undertake greater 
political liberalization. At the time of writing, however, the only concession Washington 
seems to have won from Tashkent is a commitment, issued in a recent joint statement 
by the two governments, for Uzbekistan "to accelerate its program of reform to achieve 
economic liberalization and a market economy, including current account convertibility." 
For its part, Washington has pledged "to expand its broad cooperation and assistance 
to support these goals."(43) In the past, the US has paid a high price for its uncritical 
support of increasingly authoritarian regimes. The US government must choose its next 
steps very wisely if it truly wishes to promote peace and stability in the vital and volatile 
region of Central Asia. 
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